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I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique efficient
equilibrium within a particular class of trigger strategy equilibria. I then consider a series of comparative
statics and extensions: (a) if for some exogenous reason one of the countries becomes more lenient towards
mergers, than the other country becomes more lenient as well; (b) merger remedies increase the probability
that a merger is approved and increase total welfare; (c) the effects of a merger wave are magnified by the
equilibrium approval policy.
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1. Introduction
In a world that is increasingly global, merger policy seems to follow the trend. The GE/
Honeywell merger and other related cases show that large mergers must be approached from an
international perspective. They also show that different merger authorities may have different
evaluations of the welfare impact of a merger, different utility functions, or both. Whichever is
the case, the fact is that any proposed merger of significant size must pass at least the U.S. and
the EU tests.
As a solution to the problem of merger policy in a global world, former U.S.
Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein proposed the creation of a world wide merger0167-7187/$ - see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.08.007
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L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751740authority.1 However, this solution is unlikely to be feasible, both politically and informationally.
Politically, the problems stem from the near impossibility of enforcement at the international
level. Informationally, there is the problem inherent in centralized decision making.2
In this paper, I propose a solution to the enforcement problem. Specifically, I propose the
equilibrium self-enforcement of merger policy in a repeated interaction context. The idea of
using repeated interaction to enforce cooperative agreements is obviously not novel. However,
the specific nature of the game played between antitrust authorities warrants a specific analysis. I
characterize an efficient trigger strategy Nash equilibrium and show that it is unique (within its
class). In this equilibrium, each country is willing to accept a merger proposal that is welfare
reducing from that country’s perspective but welfare increasing from a worldwide perspective.
I consider a number of extensions of the basic framework. In Section 5, I study the case when
one of the countries becomes more lenient towards mergers and show that, under some
conditions, this leads the other country to be more lenient as well (bcontagious leniencyQ). In
Section 6, I consider the possibility of merger remedies, which I model as welfare reducing
utility transfers. Finally, in Section 7 I study the impact of a merger wave. I show that the
frequency of approved mergers increases during the wave, so that the equilibrium policy
magnifies the effects of the merger wave.
2. Repeated merger policy games
Over time, a number of merger proposals take place, some among firms in a given country,
some among firms from different countries. Whichever is the case, the welfare impact of a
specific merger is likely to be different in different countries. In addition to differences in
location, the impact of the merger may differ because different countries place different weights
on profits and consumer surplus.3 Given a merger proposal, antitrust authorities in each country
must decide whether or not to approve the merger.
I model this situation as a repeated game between two countries. In each period of the
repeated game, Nature determines whether a merger is proposed (probability U). Nature also
determines the welfare impact of the merger in country i, wi (i =1,2), according to the c.d.f.
F(w1; w2), which I assume is smooth and has full support. If a merger is proposed, then each
country’s merger authority decides whether to approve the merger. Finally, I make the important
assumption that a merger only takes place if approved by both merger authorities.
Consider the stage game where a merger is proposed and the values of wi are observed. A
natural equilibrium of this game is for the merger to go through if and only if wiz0 for both i.
The problem with this equilibrium is that many efficient mergers are vetoed. Fig. 1 depicts this
problem. Let S be the set of possible values of (w1,wj). Efficient mergers correspond to points to
the NE of the second diagonal, w1+w2z0. This area can be subdivided into three subregions. In
region A, the merger is welfare improving for both countries. In region D1, the merger increases
Country 2’s welfare but decreases Country 1’s welfare (by a lower amount). Finally, in region
D2 the opposite is true: Country 1’s welfare increases but Country 2’s decreases (by a lower1 bI. . .believe that, whatever happens on antitrust at the WTO. . ., we should move in the direction of a Global
Competition Initiative, cautiously and on an exploratory basis, but in the end I think such a development is almost
inevitableQ (Klein, 2000). For a different perspective, see Fox (1998).
2 In this regard, see Barros and Cabral (1994), Neven et al. (1994), Bacchetta et al. (1997), Head and Ries (1997),
Neven and Ro¨ller (2000).
3 Barros and Cabral (1994), Neven and Ro¨ller (2001) and others develop models that suggest possible sources of
divergence across antitrust authorities. I take a reduced-form approach that is consistent with all of these models.
4 That is, d reflects both the length between periods and the probability that a merger proposal arises in each period
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Fig. 1. Agreement and disagreement over merger decisions.
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751 741amount). In the static equilibrium considered above, only mergers in Region A go through.
Mergers lying in Regions Di, though efficient, are not approved.
Consider now the infinite repetition of the above stage game, making the additional
assumptions that the values of wi are independently distributed across periods and that both
countries have a common interest rate r. Define duq / 1+ r the effective discount factor.4 The
basic intuition from repeated game theory suggests that the set of attainable payoffs in the
repeated game is larger than the set of stage equilibria. In other words, there are mergers that
would not be approved in a static equilibrium but might be approved in a dynamic equilibrium.
The intuition is that each country will refrain from pursuing its short-run interest as this might
reduce future payoff. I make this point more precise in the next section.
3. Maximal concession equilibria
Consider a set of equilibrium strategies xi
t(wt, ht), i =1,2 indicating the probability that
country i approves the proposal submitted at time t, wt =(w1
t, x2
t), given a history ht of past
decisions by both countries. I focus on the set of optimal trigger-strategy equilibria that
maximize joint discounted payoff, Rlt¼0
R
S
dtxt1 w
t; htð Þxt2 wt; htð Þ wt1 þ wt2
 
dF wð Þ, subject to the
constraint that the strategies xt1 w
t; htð Þ form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in trigger
strategies with reversion to the static Nash equilibrium. A trigger strategy equilibrium is defined
by a cooperative phase, a punishment phase, and the rules that: (a) play starts in the cooperative
phase; (b) play continues in the cooperative phase as long as players choose the designated
cooperative action; (c) play switches to the start of the punishment phase whenever a player
chooses an action different from the designated action for whatever phase play is on; (d) starting
from the punishment phase, play reverts to the cooperative phase after T periods. A trigger-
strategy equilibrium with reversion to Nash corresponds to the case when the punishment phase
amounts to the play of the static Nash equilibrium. For simplicity, I will refer to the above
optimal equilibria as simply boptimal equilibria.Q
These equilibria correspond roughly to the equilibria developed in Green and Porter (1984) in
the context of oligopoly collusion. Unlike Green and Porter (1984), I do not consider the case of
incomplete information. For this reason, the optimal trigger-strategy equilibrium would.
Fig. 2. Agreement and disagreement over merger decisions.
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751742correspond to T=l.5 However, a finite T may be more realistic in the present context.
Moreover, as will become clear, the results do not depend on the value of T.
My first result characterizes the structure of optimal equilibria.
Proposition 1. (maximum concession equilibria)
Along the cooperative phase of an optimal equilibrium, a merger proposal is approved by
both countries if and only if (i) w1+w2z0, (ii) w1z l1, and (iii) w2z l2.
Proof. Denote by S is the set of proposals that are approved along the cooperative phase. Define
li(S) to be the highest loss that country i can sustain such that the no-deviation constraint in a
trigger-strategy equilibrium is just satisfied. By vetoing today’s merger, a country expects a
discounted payoff of 0+dNi, where Ni is the expected discounted payoff following deviation
(history independent in the case of a trigger-strategy equilibrium). By approving the merger, a
country expects a discounted payoff of  li +dEi, where Ei ¼ Rlt¼0dt
R
S
xt1 w
t; htð Þxt2 wt; htð Þwtid
F wð Þ is expected payoff along the equilibrium path (assuming xt1 wt; htð Þ is the equilibrium
strategy described in the proposition). We thus have li(S)=d(EiNi).
The proof has two parts. First I show necessity, viz. that if waS then (i) w1+w2z0, (ii)
w1z li and (iii) w2z l2. Second I show sufficiency, viz. that if (i) w1+w2z0, (ii) w1z li
and (iii) w2z l2.then waS.
Part A: necessity. I first prove that w1+w2z0 must hold for all points in S. Refer to Fig. 2.
Suppose that wi
Az li, but w1
A +w2
Ab0. Without loss of generality, suppose also that w1
Ab0. (If
there is more than one such point satisfying the above conditions, select the one with the lowest
w2). Consider the points along the line containing the origin and point A. Suppose there exists a
point B along the same diagonal, in the opposite quadrant, that also belongs to S. Consider a ball
around A, B(A); and one around B; B(B); with densities such that
 wA1
Z
B Að Þ
f wð Þdw ¼ wB1
Z
B Bð Þ
f wð Þdw: ð1Þ5 Moreover, the optimal punishment would be the extremal punishment. If such punishment were played, then the
optimal trigger-strategy equilibrium would be globally optimal among the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751 743Note that, since A and B are on the same diagonal, it must also be the case that
wA2
R
B Að Þ f wð Þdw ¼  wB2
R
B Bð Þ f wð Þdw.
Consider now an alternative set SV that is given by S minus B(A)vB(B). By construction,
expected payoff in SVis the same as in S. Suppose then that we consider the same operation but
using point BW instead of point B, where BW lies to the SW of B. Since BaS, there must exist
such a BW that is also in S. It follows that the SW set resulting from this alternative procedure
yields a higher expected payoff (for both players) than S.
Suppose now that there exists no point B along the same diagonal, in the opposite quadrant to
A, that also belongs to S. Consider now a point B along the same diagonal, in the opposite
quadrant to A, such that w1
Bz l1.
Consider also points AW, BW, as in the figure: AW and A belong to a line of slope 1,
likewise for B and BW. Moreover, both AW and BWbelong to the same ray that crosses the origin.
If BW is sufficiently close to B, then neither A nor B belong to S. Consider an alternative set SV
obtained from S by adding balls around AW and BWwith mass such that Eq. (1) holds (for points
AWand BW instead of A, B). Expected payoff is the same in SVas in S. But then we can construct a
new set SWwith a point Bj slightly to the NE of BW, yielding a higher expected payoff for both
players.
To conclude part A of the proof, note that wiz li (S) is also necessary. In fact, I defined li(S)
as the value such that the no-deviation constraint is exactly satisfied.
Part B: sufficiency. I now show that, (i) if w1+w2z0, (ii) w1z l1, and (iii) w2z l2, then
in an optimal trigger-strategy equilibrium it must be that waS. Consider a point A not in, but
close to, S. Suppose that w1
A N l1, w1B N l1, w1A+w1BN0. Suppose there is a point BaS in the
same quadrant as A and such that w1
B+w2
B=w1
A+w2
A, w1
B N l1, w2B N l2. We can then find
balls B(A) and B(B) such that adding B(A) to and subtracting B(B) from S keeps both players’
expected payoff constant. But then there must exist a point BW to the SW of BVsuch that adding
B(A) to and subtracting B(BV) from S increases both players’ payoff, which contradicts
optimality.
Suppose now that no point B exists satisfying the above conditions. Then there exists an
AVaS (close to A) and a BWgS in the same quadrant and such that w1BW+w2BW=w1AV+w2AV,
w1
BWN l1, w2BWN l2. We can then find balls B(AV) and B(BW) such that adding B(BW) to and
subtracting B(AV) from S keeps both players’ expected payoff constant. But then there must exist
a point AW to the SW of AVsuch that adding B(BW) to and subtracting B(AV) from S increases both
players’ payoff, which contradicts optimality. 5.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Fig. 3. Optimal equilibrium: proposed mergers in the shaded region are approved (along the equilibrium path).
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751744Proposition 1 is in line with well-known results in the repeated-game literature. The novel
aspect here is the precise nature of the cooperative phase, namely the fact that each country
approves efficient mergers up to a maximum bconcessionQ level  li. In words, each country is
willing to accept a negative welfare impact  li in the short run in return for the other country not
vetoeing future efficient mergers where country i stands to gain but country j loses (by a smaller
amount). Fig. 3 illustrates the result. In this figure, the mergers belonging to the shaded region
are approved along the equilibrium path. Notice that, if d is less than one and S is sufficiently
large, then there will still be efficient mergers that are not approved in equilibrium. For a finite S,
it can be shown that there exists a d¯ such that, if d N d¯, then all efficient mergers are approved in
equilibrium (folk theorem).
In the next three sections, I consider some extensions of the optimal equilibrium when d b d¯.
4. Uniqueness
I now show that there exists a unique optimal equilibrium, that is, a unique equilibrium in
trigger strategies with reversion to Nash that maximizes joint payoffs.6 This result is interesting
from a game-theoretic point of view. More importantly, its proof suggests an important property:
the bcomplementarityQ between each country’s value of li.
Proposition 2. (uniqueness)
There exists a unique optimal equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a trigger-strategy equilibrium with reversion to the static Nash equilibrium. The
no-deviation constraint is given by
 li þ dEizdNi;
or simply
liVUi li; lj
 
;
where
Ui li; lið Þu d
1 d
Z
wiNli
wi f wð Þdw
Z
wiN0
wi f wð Þdw

:

Notice that (a) Ui(0, 0)=0, (b) Ui(0, lj)z0 (with strict inequality if ljN0), (c) Ui(li, lj) is
bounded, (d) Ui(li, lj) is strictly decreasing in li, (e) Ui(li, lj) is strictly increasing in lj. This
implies that (a) there exists a unique li*(lj) such that li=Ui(li, lj), (b) l*(0)=0, (c) li*(lj) is strictly
increasing in lj, (d) li*(lj) is bounded.
The above imply that the set of feasible equilibrium values li, defined by liV li*(lj), must have a
shape like that in Fig. 4. It follows that for any utility function increasing in li there exists a unique
optimal value. The extension to the case of T period punishments is straightforward. 5
In words, the essence of the proof of Proposition 2 is that there is a bcomplementarityQ
between the values of li. That is, the maximum concession mappings li*(lj) are increasing. In the6 In fact, as will become clear, the equilibrium is unique for any joint welfare function W such that (BW /Bwi)N0.
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Fig. 4. Set of feasible equilibrium values (l1, l2).
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751 745next section, I elaborate on this interesting fact and show that, under some conditions, an
increase in leniency by one country leads to an increase in leniency by the other country as well.
5. Contagious leniency
Suppose that one of the countries changes its utility function. Specifically, I consider the
case when one of the countries becomes more lenient towards mergers. For example, if a
country places an increasing relative weight on firm profits, then the welfare impact of the
merger is likely to be higher (in other words, for a given merger the value of wi is higher). I
model bincreased leniencyQ by assuming that the distribution of w is given by F(w1a, w2)
and considering an increase in a (that is, Country A becoming more lenient). The main result
is that, under some conditions, an increase in leniency by one of the countries leads both
countries to increase their maximum concession levels li. That is, in terms of optimal
equilibrium strategies, leniency is bcontagious.Q For the purpose of the next result, it is useful
to define d to be the infimum of all values of d such that a non-trivial optimal equilibrium
(li N0) is viable.
Proposition 3. (contagious leniency)
Suppose that d is greater than, but close to, d. Then Bli /Ba N0, i =1,2. In words, as a country
becomes more lenient towards mergers (increase in a) both countries increase their levels of
mutual concession ( li).
Proof. Let
Ui li; lj; a; d
 
u
d
1 d
Z
wiNli
wif w; að Þdw
Z
wiN0
wif w; að Þdw

:

In a optimal equilibrium, li =Ui(li, lj; a, d). Differentiating with respect to a, we get
1 BU1
Bl1
 BU1
Bl2
 BU2
Bl1
1 BU2
Bl2
2
64
3
75
dl1
dl2
2
64
3
75 ¼
BU1
Ba
BU2
Ba
2
64
3
75da
Solving with respect to li, we get
dli
da
¼ D1 BUi
Ba
1 BUj
Blj

þ BUj
Ba
BUi
Blj
 
;

ð2Þ
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751746where
Du 1 BU1
Bl1

1 BU2
Bl2

 BU1
Bl2
BU2
Bl1
N0:

Let d be the infimum of all values of d such that a non-trivial optimal equilibrium (li N0) is
viable. Suppose that d =d+e, where e is arbitrarily small. It follows that the values li in the
optimal equilibrium are of order e too.
I will now consider a shift in F along Player 1’s axis and argue that BU1 /Ba is of greater
order of magnitude than BU2 /Ba. Recall that Ui is proportional to the difference between
expected payoff along the equilibrium path and expected payoff along the one-shot Nash
equilibrium. This difference corresponds to areas A1 and A2 in Fig. 5.
For Player 1, the change in F1 originating in A1 is of order e d~, where e comes from the fact
that the probability of being in area A1 is of order e. The change in F1 originating in A2 is of
order e3 d~, where one e comes from the probability of being in A2, one from the value of w1
(being of order e), and one from the change in f(w) (also of order e).
For Player 2, the change in F2 originating in A2 is of order e
2 da, where one e comes from the
probability of being in area A1 and the other from the value of w2. The change in U2 originating
in A2 is of order e
2 d~, where one e comes from the probability of being in A2 and the other
from the change in f(w).
From Eq. (2), we then get
sign
dli
da

¼ sign BUj
Ba
BUi
Blj

N0;

since both BUj /Ba and BUj /Blj are positive. 5
The intuition for Proposition 3 can be seen with reference to Fig. 4. An increase in a implies
an outward shift in l1*(l2). If l2*(l1) does not change that much, then the shift in l1*(l2) will result
in an increase both in l1 and in l2. In other words, Proposition 3 results from the fact that l2*(l1) is
increasing. The assumption that d is greater than, but close to, d is quite important. For higher
values of d, both l1*(l2) and l2*(l1) will shift with a change in a. Intuitively, the fact that E2
increases makes Country 2 more willing to be lenient (increase in l2). However, an increase in a
also increases N2. It is not generally clear which effect will dominate. In a separate paper, Cabral
(2003), I show by numerical example that, if F is uniform and for particular parameter values,.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Fig. 5. Relevant areas for variation in Ui caused by changes in a.
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negative, the effect on N2 dominates the effect on E2.
6. Remedies
In the previous sections, I have made the assumption that merger proposals are exogenously
given and that there is nothing merger authorities can do about it other than to decide whether to
approve it or not. Clearly, things are more complex in practice. Specifically, it is frequently the
case that mergers are conditionally approved. For example, in the recent GE/Honeywell merger
proposal, the EU requested a series of asset sales as a condition for giving its approval
(eventually, GE refused the offer and the EU blocked the merger).
I model the possibility of asset sales or other remedies by changing the structure of the stage
game. In the previous sections, I have assumed that once a merger proposal w is exogenously
given, each country simultaneously approves or vetoes the merger. Now I suppose that, if wi b0,
then country i has the option of requesting a change in the terms of the merger as a condition for
its approval.
The typical request by country i would be some form of asset transfer. Naturally, such
operation would imply a change in welfare impact both for country i and for country j.
Accordingly, I model the possibility of merger remedies by assuming that utility can be
transferred across countries according to W(wV; w)=0. In words, starting from merger proposal
w, all points wVsuch that W(wV; w)=0 are attainable by means of merger remedies.
Typically, the implicit plot of W(w; wV)=0 will have a slope lower than one: in order to
increase country i’s welfare by one dollar, country j’s welfare is decreased by more than a dollar.
For example, GE’s asset divesture as part of the Honeywell deal would increase EU’s welfare
(given its impact on GE’s European competitors and, possibly, European consumers). However,
its impact on GE’s profit is likely to have a greater negative impact on US welfare than the
positive impact in the EU.
My main result in this section is that the possibility of asset sales increases the set of approved
mergers.
Proposition 4. (remedies)
Suppose that F is symmetric about the main diagonal. Along the cooperative phase of an
optimal equilibrium, both countries approve a merger (with no remedies) if w1+w2z0 and
wiz li, i=1,2. If wib li and there exists a wVsuch that W(wV; w)=0 and wiV= li, then player
j proposes wVand both countries approve the merger. Otherwise, the merger is vetoed by both
players.
Proof. Clearly, the points in the shaded region of Fig. 3 should be in the approved-merger region
with remedies. (The possibility of remedies cannot make things worse off). Consider a point A
that belongs to the shaded region in Fig. 6 but not to the shaded region of Fig. 3. Consider a
symmetric equilibrium and suppose the merger wA is not approved in equilibrium. Consider an
alternative equilibrium such that both A and its symmetric counterpart, AV are approved. By
construction, there exist points B; BVsuch that (i) W(B, A)=0, W(BV, AV)=0; (ii) w1Bz0, w1BVz0;
(iii) w2
Bz0, w2
BVz0; (iv) w1
B+w2
Bz0, w1
BV+w2
BVz0. It follows that the new proposed solution (a)
is a subgame perfect equilibrium, (b) yields a higher payoff. 5
Fig. 6 illustrates the point. In this figure, I assume, for simplicity, that the implicit plot of
W(wV; w)=0 is linear. It should be noted that the equilibrium values of li in Proposition 4 are not
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Fig. 6. Optimal equilibrium with asset sales.
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751748identical to the ones in Proposition 1; in fact, they are greater. Finally, notice that, if the slope of
U is greater than one, then the set of approved mergers would be even greater. In fact, there
might be mergers initially classified as inefficient (w1+w2b0) which become efficient once
asset sales are taken into consideration.
7. Merger waves
One of the most commonly known facts about mergers is that they take place in waves.7 In
terms of my model, a merger wave can be thought of as a temporary increase in q, the pro-
bability that, in each period, a merger proposal is made. My last results pertain to the dynamics
of li with respect to a temporary change (e.g., increase) in q. Specifically, suppose the rate of
merger proposals follows a two-state Markov process (high and low). I will consider two
extreme possibilities, unanticipated and anticipated merger waves, and show that both lead to the
following result.
Proposition 5. (merger waves)
The fraction of approved merger proposals is higher during a merger wave than after.
Proof. Let us first consider the simplest case, unanticipated merger waves. By analogy with the
previous results, let U(s) be the difference in discounted future profits between cooperating and
deviating today, where s is the current state. Notice that U(H)NU(L)N0. In fact, during the H
state, we could replicate the solution during the L state (veto some of the mergers with some
probability). Since in an optimal equilibrium li(s)=Ui(s), it follows that li is higher in the high
state. Finally, it follows that the probability a merger is approved is higher too.
Consider now the case of a one-time anticipated merger wave. In particular, suppose that it is
known the state will switch from L to H from tV to tW (and back to L after tW). Let U(t) be the
difference in discounted future profits between cooperating and deviating at date t. U(t) is lowest
for t N tW, implying the fraction of proposed mergers is lowest during that period. As we move
backwards from tW, the fraction of approved mergers increases. At tW, this results from a higher q.
At tW1, this results both from at higher q and a higher expected future payoff at tW. And so7 In this paper, I take merger waves as exogenously given. For a theory of merger waves and a review of the relevant
literature, see Toxvaerd (2002).
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L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751 749forth. Finally, for t b tV, future expected payoff declines as we move backward in time, both
because we have a lower q and because the period of higher payoff ([tV, tW]) moves farther into
the future. 5
Fig. 7 illustrates Proposition 5. In this figure, the frequency of proposed mergers increases
during the period [tV, tW]. If the merger wave in unanticipated, then the proportion of mergers
that are approved increases during the period [tV, tW]; that is, f3 / f1N f5 / f4. If the merger wave is
perfectly anticipated, then the proportion of proposed mergers that are approved increases
during the period leading up to tV. During the wave, the proportion of proposed mergers that
are approved declines. Finally, at time tW the frequency of approved mergers drops to its
lowest value. Notice that the proportion of proposed mergers that are approved is also lowest
after time tW.
In words, Proposition 5 implies that the optimal equilibrium amplifies the exogenous
variations of a wave of proposed mergers. In Fig. 7, there is 100% increase in the frequency of
proposed mergers between top and bottom of the cycle. However, the difference in terms of
approved mergers is much greater. Specifically, in the case of an anticipated merger wave we
have f2 / f1N f6 / f4, whereas in the case of an unanticipated merger wave we have f3 / f1N f5 / f4.
In words, the result states that the proportion of approved mergers increases during (and
before) an economic boom (which is usually associated to a merger wave). The intuition for this
result is that before and during a boom the future expected equilibrium payoff is higher, thus
providing greater slack in the no-deviation constraint.
This is only apparently in contradiction with the intuition from Rotemberg and Saloner’s
(1986) theory of repeated games with fluctuating demand. In their analysis, periods of high
demand are typically associated with less efficient collusion. The naive extension would be to
expect less efficient compromise when the level of activity is higher. However, the structure of
my model is quite different from Rotemberg and Saloner. In my model, a higher activity level
corresponds to more frequent interaction, whereas in their model a higher activity level
corresponds to greater payoffs today with respect to future payoffs.
8. Concluding remarks
I have proposed a repeated-game approach to the problem of international merger policy
coordination. Although my analysis is somewhat stylized, it suggests a number of interesting
L.M.B. Cabral / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (2005) 739–751750results. For example, Proposition 3 suggests that my bmutual concessionQ equilibrium, as the
name suggests, is a two-way street: in order for a country to increase its concession level, it is
necessary for the other country to increase its concession level as well.
The foundation of the analysis in this paper is the idea that repeated interaction allows for the
self-enforcement of rules that otherwise would not be implementable. This is not a novel idea.
Much of the recent trade policy literature is based on the same premise.8 What happens when
trade policy and merger policy are put together? It is known from game theory that repeated
interaction on several strategic variables yields more efficient equilibria than interaction over one
variable only.9 A number of authors, including Neven and Seabright (1997), Bond (1997), Motta
and Onida (1997), Rysman (2000), Franc¸ois and Horn (2000), Richardson (1999), and Horn and
Levinsohn (2001) look explicitly at the relation between trade policy and competition policy,
including merger policy. However, none of these papers tackles the issue of repeated interaction
as indicated above. To my knowledge, Spagnolo (2001) is the first to look at the optimal design
of self-enforcing international policy agreements in a multi-issue context. One promising avenue
for further research is to study how my results regarding mergers would extend to a multi-issue
context, including trade policy and other dimensions of international policy cooperation.
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